Philosophy is memory reliable
Causal theory of memory
Gibson, J. In light of these problems, many researchers have abandoned first-order content-based approaches in favour of the second-order content-based and phenomenological approaches discussed below. Bartlett, Frederic. Don Locke thinks that if we have no reason to believe MR, we have no knowledge via memory at all. Endorses preservationism and anti-generativism, while alleging parallels between memory and testimony. Progress in understanding psychological kinds and systems more generally is required in order to settle these issues. Since memory traces, impressions, or images have figured in theories of memory from Aristotle, through Descartes and theorists of the association of ideas, into the 21st century, it may seem that little progress has been made. Always the attentive reader, Reid quotes the passage from Hume's Treatise of Human Nature in which Hume offers his initial characterization of memory. Routledge, Hume's account, must be memory. First, as Hume himself recognizes, there is nothing in principle to prevent an idea of memory from being decidedly faint and without force just as ideas of imagination can be vivid and forceful.
Some critics of representations complain that, in memory, there is no direct awareness of a trace or idea from which, in a two-step process, the subject then indirectly infers the past event or experience.
It may matter whether the particular way, in which you would form or keep the belief that there are boxes in the basement, tends to get at the truth.
Philosophy of memory
Memories can be easily manipulated and altered in many different ways, from simple re-telling where little details may be unwittingly changed each time a memory is told, to the power of suggestion in which an entirely false memory can be implanted into a persons mind and believed to be true by that person. And, as noted earlier, Locke thinks that if there is memory knowledge, then MR is true. And, supposing it is, why agree that we can rule out the alternatives that are relevant? If perception is direct, storage might be held either not to involve traces or to involve traces. I have a power to turn my eyes again toward the picture, and immediately the perception is revived. Remembering requires knowing just in case all of the following are true: remembering requires believing, remembering requires justification and remembering requires non-accidental truth. Paul K. But on other theories of justification, perhaps we remain reasonable in thinking that memory justifies.
Conee and Feldman offer starting material for a final internalist, evidentialist-friendly solution to the Problem of Stored Beliefs. Yet this condition is pretty clearly false. This thinking and inferring is not instantaneous.
So, anyone who offers such a challenge undermines her own position.
Indirect representationalism holds that perception is indirect and that traces are distinct from the representations involved in perception. It could very well be that memory is reliable and justifying, but that we simply have a hard time showing it.
based on 38 review